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Russian soldiers sent Olga Novikova, founder/director of Mariupol film festival video with her captured son demanding to pay 5000 Euro ransom for his life. If not they promised to send video of his execution. links in comments. pic.twitter.com/VBtauH45IZ
Two charming little actresses, Elizabeth and Sonya, of the city theatre of Mariupol. They both performed the role of Lucy in "The Chronicles of Narnia: The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe".
The 'special military operation' continues to reach new lows. on 10:02 - Feb 24 by BloomBlue
They don't need Western tech, they have Chinese tech, which when it comes to hardware underpins a huge percentage of Western tech.
Plus very soon they will have Chinese weapons.
You're correct re gas but oil is offsetting that loss, India for example is again increasing the amount of oil its buying Russia
There is some tech that China cannot manufacture though. The latest nodes for producing semi-conductors cannot be made in China. We think about things like iphones being made in China, but the silicon all comes from Taiwan. China is a huge part of the supply chain, but they still have limits. It's why China are making concerted efforts in industrial espionage into companies like ASML which is the most important tech company that no-one has heard of.
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The 'special military operation' continues to reach new lows. on 10:56 - Feb 24 with 4926 views
US historian Timothy Snyder on how Ukraine has REDUCED the possibility of nuclear conflict worldwide…
That's been a problem in the discussion of the Russian invasion. Media get your attention by writing of escalation! Not to mention: nuclear threats! And: nuclear war! There is a profit motive at work here, one that Russian propagandists exploit by their references to nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the atmospherics of what should be a sober conversation are brought more by a counting of dollars than by a reckoning of risks.
That is one reason why we should be ashamed of our discussion of nuclear war, but not the main one. Our nuclear talk is a way to claim victimhood, and then to blame the actual victims. Once we turn our attention to a hypothetical exchange of missiles, we get to imagine that we are the victims. Suddenly the actual war no longer seems to matter, since our lives (we imagine) are at risk. And the Ukrainians seem to be at fault. If only they would stop fighting, then we could all be safe. This, of course, is exactly how Russian propagandists want us to reason. And it is wrong.
Not just morally wrong, though of course it is that. Actual Ukrainians are actually fighting and dying in a war that serves our security in countless ways -- including by reducing the risk of nuclear war, as I'll discuss below. And we spend our time imagining our own victimhood?
Yielding to Russian nuclear talk is also wrong, and embarrassingly so, as strategic thinking. It is an example of a narcissistic fantasy that looms over discussions of American foreign policy: the fantasy of omnipotent submission. This is the notion, birthed in American exceptionalism and impatience, that since America is the power behind everything, all will be well if America does nothing. If we do what the Russian propagandists want, and do nothing for Ukraine, then (in this fantasy) there will be no nuclear war.
In the fantasy of omnipotent submission, America has the magical power, by way of complete inaction, to restore a peaceful status quo where we could all sleep soundly. But America has no such power. And there is no way to do nothing. American policymakers have to act within a certain setting, formed by many actors in complex interactions, in which doing nothing will always have consequences, just as doing something will always have consequences. Doing nothing is, in fact, always amounts to doing something, and usually (as in the case of Russian invasion) it is the wrong something! In this case, doing nothing (to support Ukraine) would increase the risk of nuclear war. By doing something specific, by supplying arms to Ukraine, the United States has assisted the Ukrainians in decreasing the chances of nuclear war.
I can only make this argument if you will follow me into the realm of strategic thinking. We have to do this step by step. The fantasy of omnipotent submission builds and releases anxiety. Someone in Russia issues a threat; feckless commentators and propagandists amplify it; and then we seek a quick way to release the fear. Or: the United States send weapons; feckless commentators and propagandists speak of escalation!; and, again, we seek a quick way to release the fear. When this becomes a habit, it takes the place of thinking about the risks and benefits policy.
In psychological terms, the fantasy of omnipotent submission is understandable. So let us understand it as psychology -- and also understand that the Russians deploy it as psychology. The fantasy is used against us. We need to be thoughtful about it in order to resist it. And as we try to work our way out from under it, we must realize that it is there to prevent strategic thinking.
So, deep breath. Russia has an interest in anxiety; media has an interest in anxiety; your body can get locked in anxiety. Getting over that is the hard part. Once we do, the strategic thinking is the easy part. It starts in the real world. Russia invaded Ukraine. That happened. We cannot transport ourselves back to the world of 2021. (Even if we somehow could, we would just be in a world where Russia was about to invade Ukraine...). Operating within a world where the invasion happened, the soundest nuclear policy is to help Ukraine win a conventional war. This is for four reasons.
First, it would be a disaster for everyone if Russian nuclear blackmail succeeded. If any nuclear state can coerce others by references to its nuclear stockpile, then foreign policy of any kind becomes impossible, non-nuclear states will always have to yield, and nuclear states will run the world. If Russian nuclear blackmail succeeds, we can expect not only more Russian nuclear blackmail, but also nuclear blackmail from other nuclear powers. We can also expect that other countries will build nuclear weapons to resist future blackmail. And so support of Ukraine decreases the chances of nuclear war by showing that nuclear blackmail does not work.
Second, global nuclear proliferation should be prevented. The risk of nuclear war has a mathematical character. The more countries have nuclear weapons, the more likely it becomes that they will be used. Russian policy pushes in the direction of nuclear proliferation. Ukraine actually gave up its nuclear weapons. Then Russia invaded, in 2014 and again in 2022. The lesson for non-nuclear states is that they will need nuclear weapons to deter Russian invasion, or invasion by any nuclear power. The way to prevent that conclusion is for Ukraine to win a conventional war. And so support of Ukraine reduces the chances of nuclear war by reducing the likelihood of nuclear proliferation.
Third, the European scenario for nuclear confrontation should be made as unlikely as possible. That scenario is a large war between Russia and NATO, in which there would be nuclear powers on both sides. In its Soviet and then its later Russian variant, this vision has haunted the minds of Americans and Europeans for decades. Thanks to Ukrainian resistance, such a war is far less likely than it has been. The forces Russia might have used in an attack on a NATO member are [SS1] being destroyed in Ukraine. Even in the scenario where Russia somehow does mount an offensive against a NATO state, any temptation to use nuclear weapons in response has been reduced by the knowledge that Russia can be defeated in a conventional war. And so support of Ukraine reduces the chance of nuclear war making the European scenario less likely.
Fourth, the Asian scenario for nuclear confrontation should be made as unlikely as possible. In the last couple of decades, the possibility of a Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan has dominated discussions in Washington. Americans have been frustrated and frightened by what they take to be the inevitability of the confrontation. The idea that some other country might deflect it was never part of the debate. But that is happening. By resisting Russia, Ukrainians have forced Beijing to recognize that offensive operations are risky and can end badly. Beijing has by no means lost interest in Taiwan, but it is safe to say that any drastic move has been delayed, at least for a few years.
And these are an important few years. A year ago, when Russia invaded, the conventional wisdom was still that China was a rising power. In the broader American thinking about all this, this was the essence pf the problem: a rising power (China) must confront a declining power (the U.S.). Now it is much less clear that China is a rising power. The Ukrainians have delayed the most dangerous scenario; and in doing so, they might have gotten us through the most dangerous moment. Notably, they have done all this without confronting China. And so support of Ukraine reduces the chance of nuclear war by making the Asian scenario much less likely.
If we want to reduce the risk of global nuclear war, then we should arm Ukrainians. Doing so reduces the appeal of nuclear blackmail, the risk of nuclear proliferation, and the likelihood of the scenarios.
If what we have in mind is a local use by Russia of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, this is a different question. It is impossible to rule out. But here the risk is one that the Ukrainians have a right to discuss, since it is their land and their people. Over and over again, they have made plain that the delivery of western conventional weapons is their priority. One could say that Ukrainians are wrongly evaluating the risks: this, though, would smack of the kind of colonial arrogance that persuaded so many of us that Ukraine would not resist, or would be quickly defeated if they did. The Ukrainian leadership knows what it is doing. And they are doing what their voters want them to do.
Rather than just listening to Ukrainians about their evaluation of risk of local nuclear use, we sometimes seek Putin's inner thoughts. When people imagine the use of Russian nuclear weapons in Ukraine, a certain weird empathy comes into play: Putin will feel that his back is against the wall, that he has no choice.
If we treat that as a hypothesis, we see that it has been disproven. Russia lost the battles of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson without using nuclear weapons. Russia has suffered almost a year of surprising defeats of various kinds, not least the collapse of its entire war plan, which involved overthrowing the Ukrainian government and controlling the entire country. And yet: no nuclear weapon use. Instead, each defeat generates stories about how Russia was not actually defeated. That is worth noting. The escalation one actually sees is narrative. It takes more and more work for Russians to explain defeat as victory. But so far they have been up to the task.
Wars end when the political power of rulers is threatened, and we have not yet reached that point. When we do, Putin will feel the threat in Moscow, not in Ukraine. In such a situation, using nuclear weapons in Ukraine will not help him. Withdrawing conventional forces from Ukraine for a power struggle in Russia might. During that power struggle, no Russian struggling for control of the Kremlin will admit that the war in Ukraine was lost. Instead, contenders for power will compete with their stories of how grand the victory actually was. My expectation is that the next Russian leader (or Putin if he remains) will claim that Russia won an extraordinary victory over NATO by eliminating NATO forces in Ukraine before they had a chance to cross into Russian territory.
In both the global and the Ukrainian settings, the Russian calculation is that nuclear talk will induce Europeans and North Americans to deter themselves from sending weapons. But deploying talk is very different from deploying weapons. Indeed, it is an alternative to doing so. We too easily assume that the word must be the antecedent to the deed. But the word is the deed. When deploying nuclear talk is the policy, then actually deploying a nuclear weapon undoes the policy. The implied threat is no longer available, once used. And the Russian leadership knows that the Americans and everyone else would send more far, far weapons to Ukraine were Russia to use a battlefield nuclear weapon.
The use of a nuclear weapon on the Ukrainian battlefield would have far greater costs than this for Russia: in the moment, and for years and decades down the line. Moscow would lose even what tentative support it has around the world. It would forfeit its ability to present itself as a victim in international relations. Its leaders would know that they would be remembered as criminals and pariahs. And that is not even to mention what would usually be mentioned first: direct deterrence. Should Russia break the taboo of nuclear use, its own status as a military power would be dramatically compromised by the military response of others.
Nuclear weapons are symbolic, for different people in different ways. I want to close on the question of status, from the Russian point of view. People sometimes say that a nuclear power cannot lose a war. This that makes historians cry into their pillows. The United States is a nuclear power that loses wars on a regular basis. The Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan, Russia lost the first Chechen war. The French nuclear test in 1960 did not save it from defeat in Algeria, any more than British nuclear weapons preserved the Empire. The use of a battlefield nuclear weapon will not win the war for Russia in Ukraine, but it would be a tremendous blow to Russian status, which is something that Russian leaders do care about.
This requires some explanation. When this war began, the two things that made Russians believe that they were a superpower were the army and the nuclear arsenal. The first source of status is now in question. If Russia uses a nuclear weapon, that is an admission that its army has been beaten. So the first source of status has been conceded -- along with the second. The moment Russia uses a nuclear weapon, other countries, including those with superior economies and scientific establishments, will build their own nuclear arsenals. When that happens, Russia ceases to be a superpower, even in the minds of Russians. That, for Russian elites, is the one intolerable outcome of this war. It is far worse than withdrawing troops from Ukraine -- for that there will always be a story. There is no story that can restore the sense of superpower status after it is lost.
It has been a year since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The magic of anniversaries assures that there will be many articles about Ukraine on February 24th, no doubt some of them reflective and interesting. I will nevertheless predict that there will be a number of essays along the lines of: "Hey, Let's Keep Talking About Nuclear War." It is also safe to say that no one will publish an op-ed along the lines of "We Talked About Putin's Mind For a Year, And We Were Wrong "; or "Despite Our Reflexive Use of the Word 'Escalation,' It Never Happened"; and certainly not "A Year After Russia's Invasion, Ukraine has Reduced the Risk of Nuclear Conflict Around the World."
But that is the most important thing to say about nuclear war: it's not happening.”
I watched BBC news just now. On it was a woman who nearly a year ago had buried her son next to their destroyed house. She is of course destroyed too. Her view was that the war will not end until ‘that animal in the Kremlin is dead’. Her words. She is right too.
There have been people on this forum doing the even handed bit, trying to justify Russian actions as a response to western aggression, appeasers, peace at any cost merchants, people that actually side with the animal that Ukraine is not a country and has no right to exist.
Rightly, those people are very much in the minority and it’s rather ironic that they are fortunate enough to live in a country that allows them to express an opinion.
What is clear one year on is that the animal’s original objective of an easy territory and asset grab is in the bin. He is left in an attritional war that he might well win thanks to western weakness, but even if he does he’s going to have to kill an awful lot of Ukrainians and possibly enslave the rest to do it. That dreadful creature has solidified resistance not broken it.
The Russians and Germans tried to do that with the Polish people over a period of 50 years and never got close to succeeding - even after the Allies so badly failed Poland. Russia won’t succeed long term with Ukraine either.
The lessons are all there. It’s up to the west, including reluctants like Germany, Italy and France, to ensure Russia doesn’t succeed even if there is an economic cost to bear. It’s time for Europe to step up and not just leave it to the US, Poland and the Baltic states. It’s in all our interests.
[Post edited 24 Feb 2023 13:45]
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The 'special military operation' continues to reach new lows. on 13:50 - Feb 24 with 4826 views
Sadly, the anniversary of the conflict brings back memories of my 94 year old mother who died a few days after it started.
One of the abiding memories I have of her last few days was her concern for the safety of Clive Myrie (a favourite of hers) when Kiev came under attack.
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The 'special military operation' continues to reach new lows. on 13:55 - Feb 24 with 4821 views
The 'special military operation' continues to reach new lows. on 13:50 - Feb 24 by DJR
Sadly, the anniversary of the conflict brings back memories of my 94 year old mother who died a few days after it started.
One of the abiding memories I have of her last few days was her concern for the safety of Clive Myrie (a favourite of hers) when Kiev came under attack.
He’s back in Kiev for the anniversary. She was right to like him. He’s a good reporter.
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The 'special military operation' continues to reach new lows. on 23:04 - Feb 24 with 4748 views
How appalling. The Germans did a similar thing. It’s not new. The idea is to reprogram the children into good Russians. I’m sure with the right…… care…… it will be successful. The people doing this, led by Putin are animals. Less than cockroaches.
And people in the west support Russia or feel that they’ve been forced into behaviour like this by NATO/ the west or that Ukraine isn’t worth the risk of supporting should have a rethink in my view..
[Post edited 25 Feb 2023 17:45]
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The 'special military operation' continues to reach new lows. on 14:43 - Feb 25 with 4585 views
The 'special military operation' continues to reach new lows. on 23:47 - Feb 24 by Churchman
How appalling. The Germans did a similar thing. It’s not new. The idea is to reprogram the children into good Russians. I’m sure with the right…… care…… it will be successful. The people doing this, led by Putin are animals. Less than cockroaches.
And people in the west support Russia or feel that they’ve been forced into behaviour like this by NATO/ the west or that Ukraine isn’t worth the risk of supporting should have a rethink in my view..
[Post edited 25 Feb 2023 17:45]
It is disgusting and I am sure that, especially at younger ages, it could be successful. However, I would imagine that for older children, the policy would be rather less successful.
Does the Russian ambassador not realise that peace is entirely in Putin's grasp? What do they think the reality of an occupation would be even if they did win? The daily resistance of Ukrainians would remain costly to the Russian occupiers.
Partisans from the "Pieramoha" (Victory) plan confirmed a successful special operation to blow up a rare Russian plane at the airfield in Machulishchy near Minsk. This is the most successful diversion since the beginning of 2022. pic.twitter.com/4Q6UmmvylT
You basically leapfrog forward in teams digging in as you with artillery support. Kind of bite and hold. This is proving successful. The losses don’t matter because convicts don’t matter. One step back, they’re shot by their own side. They’re expendable.
They used these tactics in the Winter War in 1940 and of course WW2. They won both wars so you can see why it’s an attractive tactic - as long as your soldiers are expendable and replaceable, which they of course are. Putin’s war is so disgusting.
[Post edited 2 Mar 2023 7:35]
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The 'special military operation' continues to reach new lows. on 19:38 - Mar 2 with 3417 views
I suppose this could be said to be a continuation of the parochialism of the US since Obama, which may itself have played some part in Putin making the disastrous decision that he did.
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The 'special military operation' continues to reach new lows. on 22:38 - Mar 2 with 3333 views
Bosnia was horrific but it is a question of scale.
Bosnia about 2.7 M displaced; 700,000 in other European countries. 10s of thousands killed.
According to UNHCR, Ukraine: 6.3M Ukrainians fled to other European countries and a further 6.6 M internally displaced. 2.8M of those externally displaced have gone to Russia. What proportion forcibly so? What conditions have they been displaced to? I am a little confused that the article then quotes 8M displaced in Europe. Deaths in Ukraine? Suggestions that 40,000 civilians have died so far in Ukraine.
The 'special military operation' continues to reach new lows. on 22:38 - Mar 2 by Nthsuffolkblue
Bosnia was horrific but it is a question of scale.
Bosnia about 2.7 M displaced; 700,000 in other European countries. 10s of thousands killed.
According to UNHCR, Ukraine: 6.3M Ukrainians fled to other European countries and a further 6.6 M internally displaced. 2.8M of those externally displaced have gone to Russia. What proportion forcibly so? What conditions have they been displaced to? I am a little confused that the article then quotes 8M displaced in Europe. Deaths in Ukraine? Suggestions that 40,000 civilians have died so far in Ukraine.
There is plenty of evidence of war crimes being committed in Ukraine.
This is all true and, in the West, undisputed. One of the key issues though is that it was tough getting Milosevic to The Hague and convicted. It looks to be well nigh impossible for the same treatment to be meted out to Putin - there is not just the question of power dynamics to contend with. Putin is also a blusterer, he lays out vast quantities of legalese to obfuscate any International processes. And in a war between one Orthodox nation and another Orthodox nation will any case for ethnic cleansing be proven ?
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