| Case Yellow 11:45 - May 10 with 522 views | Churchman | No, not our friends up the road! Today is the 86th anniversary of the start of Germany’s invasion of Holland, Luxembourg, Belgium and France code named Case Yellow. The germans attacked 135 Divisions with 141 of their own, more or less. They went through the Low Countries and also through the ‘impenetrable Ardennes’ and up the Somme valley. Completely out manoeuvred the battle was lost almost as soon as it started. The german army moved at pace, Panzer Divisions spearheading the assault supported by overwhelming air power. Only about 10 Divisions were fully mechanised. The rest travelled by foot mainly, kit pulled by horse or moved by train. Where there was a strongpoint like Belgium’s Eben Emael the germans were innovative and attacked it with paratroopers. German commanders had license to use their initiative and did. Something Hitler insanely stamped on when things started to go wrong later in the war. By contrast the allies tried to fight WW1. They were making decisions on events that had bypassed them. Communications? Messenger. The telephone was not to be trusted, Radar, RT, air co-ordination? France and co offered none of that. Standing patrols and hope for the best. The French army had good and bad divisions like all armies, but essentially it was rotted out, especially from a leadership perspective. The British Army was small and came under the control of the French. It was commanded by Lord Gort VC. A brave man but promoted beyond his capability. It was the only mechanised army in the field. The allies were carved in two and smashed. The BEF retreated to Dunkirk and evacuation of about 230,000 along with about 100,000 French and Belgian soldiers took place at the end of May. It was a key moment of WW2. The army left all its kit behind and a big chunk of the RAF was lost, but had the truly remarkable evacuation failed, the war would have ended there and the world would have been a very different place. The French surrendered in June and the battle for France was lost. The fall was a lesson of just how wrong you can get it. Outmoded, out thought in every way. The soldiers and the people paid dearly for political negligence, denial and pure fear in the years preceding WW2. Sadly I see the same head in the sand approach in 2026. Not from the nearest threatened, Germany, Poland, Baltics and others, but here. While they face up to the reality of an increasingly dangerous world, we do not. |  | | |  |
| Case Yellow on 11:49 - May 10 with 485 views | leitrimblue | I've just read all of that, but still can't make wether you are suggesting Ashton in or out? |  | |  |
| Case Yellow on 12:58 - May 10 with 350 views | NthQldITFC | The French generals had an average age of something like eighty, didn't they, and a penchant for cavalry charges? |  |
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| Case Yellow on 13:45 - May 10 with 287 views | Churchman |
| Case Yellow on 12:58 - May 10 by NthQldITFC | The French generals had an average age of something like eighty, didn't they, and a penchant for cavalry charges? |
Gamelin who was replaced as the debacle unfolded was 68. He didnt like leaving his chateau at Vincennes so didn’t. No phones no anything. He was replaced by Weygand who was 73. Petain, who became Vichy head honcho and was a right old traitor was 84. The only thing Gamelin was good at was blaming everyone for the collapse bar himself. Particularly the British who refused his order to advance in the hope of pincering the germans. There was no possibility of it working due to lack of men, kit, support and that the french had already legged it. Under pressure from in particular Brooke and Montgomery, Gort made the decision to head for the coast. Meanwhile, Dowding refused where he could Churchill’s ridiculous political motivated order to dribble away Fighter Command/AASF in France thus preserving enough fighters and particularly pilots to form the defence of Britain. |  | |  |
| Case Yellow on 13:47 - May 10 with 282 views | Churchman |
| Case Yellow on 11:49 - May 10 by leitrimblue | I've just read all of that, but still can't make wether you are suggesting Ashton in or out? |
I think in. Where I’ll leave for others to decide! |  | |  |
| Case Yellow on 14:20 - May 10 with 240 views | WeWereZombies | Not having Churchill's second volume of his history of the War to hand I asked AI: 'On 10 May 1940, the leadership of the Netherlands—primarily Queen Wilhelmina and the government led by Prime Minister Dirk Jan de Geer—relied on a combination of strict neutrality, a strategic defensive position known as "Fortress Holland," and a reliance on natural and man-made water barriers to protect the country against German invasion. Key elements of their reliance included:Strict Neutrality: Similar to their stance in World War I, the Dutch government hoped to maintain its neutrality and avoid conflict with Germany. The core military strategy focused on retreating to a fortified area behind waterlines (like the New Dutch Waterline) and a central core covering major cities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague. The Waterline (Inundations): The military strategy, managed largely by General Henri Gerard Winkelman (Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces), heavily involved flooding key areas to create natural barriers against ground troop movements. The Grebbe Line: A major, partially fortified, forward defensive line designed to halt the initial German advance until the main, stronger waterline could be prepared. Reliance on Allied Help: The Dutch leadership relied on the hope that French (and potentially British) reinforcements would arrive to support their weak and outdated defense lines. However, this strategy was quickly compromised by the unexpected, intense, and immediate use of German airborne troops, which landed directly behind the main defensive lines on the first day, targeting the government and airfields at The Hague. Note: On May 10, the queen and government were still present, though they fled to London shortly after the invasion began. General Winkelman took charge of the military resistance in their absence, and the next day the Dutch unconditional surrender was a fact with an exception of the southwestern province of Zalot.' |  |
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| Case Yellow on 14:36 - May 10 with 213 views | Churchman |
| Case Yellow on 14:20 - May 10 by WeWereZombies | Not having Churchill's second volume of his history of the War to hand I asked AI: 'On 10 May 1940, the leadership of the Netherlands—primarily Queen Wilhelmina and the government led by Prime Minister Dirk Jan de Geer—relied on a combination of strict neutrality, a strategic defensive position known as "Fortress Holland," and a reliance on natural and man-made water barriers to protect the country against German invasion. Key elements of their reliance included:Strict Neutrality: Similar to their stance in World War I, the Dutch government hoped to maintain its neutrality and avoid conflict with Germany. The core military strategy focused on retreating to a fortified area behind waterlines (like the New Dutch Waterline) and a central core covering major cities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague. The Waterline (Inundations): The military strategy, managed largely by General Henri Gerard Winkelman (Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces), heavily involved flooding key areas to create natural barriers against ground troop movements. The Grebbe Line: A major, partially fortified, forward defensive line designed to halt the initial German advance until the main, stronger waterline could be prepared. Reliance on Allied Help: The Dutch leadership relied on the hope that French (and potentially British) reinforcements would arrive to support their weak and outdated defense lines. However, this strategy was quickly compromised by the unexpected, intense, and immediate use of German airborne troops, which landed directly behind the main defensive lines on the first day, targeting the government and airfields at The Hague. Note: On May 10, the queen and government were still present, though they fled to London shortly after the invasion began. General Winkelman took charge of the military resistance in their absence, and the next day the Dutch unconditional surrender was a fact with an exception of the southwestern province of Zalot.' |
Thank you for that. Interesting. In a sense, I can understand the Dutch approach. It’d worked in WW1. The Belgians adopted the same policy and the allies were not allowed into Belgium until it was attacked. Given what happened to them in 1914, it was a strange position to take. Similarly, the French strategy was entirely defensive. If attacked the idea was to hold until the Royal Navy blockaded Germany into ruin, as happened in WW1. Maginot Line was considered unbreakable by them but modern though it was it only went to the Belgian border. It also ignored changing technology, especially aircraft. They had pretty good tanks and artillery, but didn't know how to use them to best effect. The door was open. Fundamentally the whole allied problem was dread of a repeat of WW1 carnage and a fantasy denial that it couldn't happen again. To an extent, Britain sort of found the least worse solution by investing in technology. Like the US later, it consciously decided meat grinder tactics using men was not the way forward which is why the British Army in 39/40 was tiny by the standards of the day. [Post edited 10 May 14:41]
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