| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet 08:40 - Oct 20 with 3221 views | ibbleobble |
I think a thread to collect information sources about the major failings of Mossad and Shin Bet would be worthwhile. While the Israeli’s gear up for an invasion, big questions need to be answered, which to date have not been, about how a series of systemic failings enabled the atrocities to happen.
It’s been reported that Egyptian intelligence warned “Israelis” that “something big” was being planned but it was ignored. This has been rebuffed as “fake news” but it seems highly unlikely that the flood of thousands of rockets into Gaza would not have gone undetected or unnoticed. Fake news or not, the 27 point incursion was met with little resistance as many of the IDF had been
diverted to the West Bank.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67082047.amp
I assume that was partly a result of Yom Kippur as it was a suspected target only weeks before with many terrorist warnings. However, you’d have thought borders and places of worship would still be on high-alert but there was little resistance anywhere along the fortified wall.
https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/377407
Whether Mossad, Shin Bet or both are directly culpable, there appears to have been a real sense of complacency, a failing amongst all agents and informants and a clear lack of communication and cohesiveness.
I’d be interested to see what other sources people are reading or find on this subject matter as no doubt, this won’t be addressed for some time as the world diverts it’s attention to prevent a major conflict and a colossal loss of life. |  | | |  |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 10:25 - Oct 20 with 3160 views | Guthrum |
Simply, it's a matter of political focus. The Israeli government's eyes were upon the West Bank and the settler situation. Plus Netanyahu's struggle to suppress the judiciary. Gaza was, for them, an under control situation, a sideshow.
Security services supply data and advice. It is the political authorities who decide whether and how to act upon it. If they are distracted, complacent or simply uninterested, nothing will be done, however dire the warnings. |  |
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| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 10:32 - Oct 20 with 3135 views | GlasgowBlue |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 10:25 - Oct 20 by Guthrum |
Simply, it's a matter of political focus. The Israeli government's eyes were upon the West Bank and the settler situation. Plus Netanyahu's struggle to suppress the judiciary. Gaza was, for them, an under control situation, a sideshow.
Security services supply data and advice. It is the political authorities who decide whether and how to act upon it. If they are distracted, complacent or simply uninterested, nothing will be done, however dire the warnings. |
Yes. It doesn’t help that Israel’s Head of Security is Itamar Ben-Gvir, a far right fanatic and terrorist supporter who has been far to occupied with attempting to suppress opposition to to those judiciary reforms.
He’s in position because of his party is helping prop up the government rather than for his qualifications to head Israel’s security. |  |
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| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 11:32 - Oct 20 with 3093 views | DJR |
I've have recently subscribed so as to get daily emails from Haaretz, an Israeli newspaper on the left or centre-left. According to the Center for Research Libraries (a consortium of North American libraries), among Israel's daily newspapers, "Haaretz is considered the most influential and respected for both its news coverage and its commentary."
Here are a couple of articles on Israel's failings.
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-20/ty-article/.premium/underprepared
https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2023-10-20/ty-article-opinion/.premium/eyes-wide
EDIT: apologies. I think you can only read these articles in full if like me you have signed up.
Here's an extract from one of the articles.
Mohammed Deif and Yahya Sinwar planned a brigade-size assault on all army posts and Israeli communities near the Gaza border with the objective of killing as many Israelis as possible, abducting hundreds of women and children to Gaza, savagely abusing the victims, terrorizing everyone else, and gathering intelligence from the army bases.
This was the mission planned by the Hamas commanders, the mission for which they trained, armed and equipped their people, as they collected intelligence for the operation and identified the time when Israel’s alertness would be particularly low, at the end of the holidays. They kept their extensive plans from leaking and pulled off a perfectly executed deception: The Israel political and military leadership, from Benjamin Netanyahu on down, was convinced that Hamas was deterred and mainly focused on economic growth and not preparations for an invasion.
Hamas’ military build-up was not kept completely out of sight. Its terrorists trained right out in the open, in broad daylight, and the Israeli side that was monitoring this activity saw infantry units being built and training for combat in Gaza.
But the IDF assumed that the Hamas elite force was being built to fight the IDF, Nukhba versus Golani, and interpreted it as a sign of Hamas becoming more establishment and transforming from a terrorist organization into a regular army. Israel failed to grasp that the confrontation with the IDF would only be a secondary mission, while the main effort would be a mass slaughter of civilians in their homes and at a large outdoor event, all through the area, and all at the same time.
This is how Hamas acted on the operational level, when the terrorists neutralized observation stations and seized control of military posts to shut down Israel’s combat intelligence, to paralyze the IDF’s command and control and leave the civilian communities defenseless.
And this is how they acted on the tactical level, in the communities that were assaulted. A holding force was positioned at the entrance to each community to block any arriving reinforcements, while the main force went house to house, where the terrorists murdered and raped and burned and tortured and kidnapped as many victims as they could find.
No one in Israel ever identified this horrific scenario as the enemy’s military objective. The scenarios for which the IDF prepared resembled occurrences from the last Gaza war in 2014: an incursion by a small force via a tunnel, a breach in the fence, or boats from the sea against an IDF outpost, or perhaps against a village or two, in order to kill and kidnap a small number of soldiers and civilians.
It was in accordance with this scenario that the thin Gaza Division force was deployed. This was the scenario that its commanders and soldiers trained for. The IDF General Staff assumed there would be sufficient warning, that the underground barrier and the border fence would thwart or delay any major attack, and that the air force would very quickly come to aid the defensive effort. [Post edited 20 Oct 2023 11:46]
|  | | |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 12:16 - Oct 20 with 3046 views | DJR |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 11:32 - Oct 20 by DJR |
I've have recently subscribed so as to get daily emails from Haaretz, an Israeli newspaper on the left or centre-left. According to the Center for Research Libraries (a consortium of North American libraries), among Israel's daily newspapers, "Haaretz is considered the most influential and respected for both its news coverage and its commentary."
Here are a couple of articles on Israel's failings.
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-20/ty-article/.premium/underprepared
https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2023-10-20/ty-article-opinion/.premium/eyes-wide
EDIT: apologies. I think you can only read these articles in full if like me you have signed up.
Here's an extract from one of the articles.
Mohammed Deif and Yahya Sinwar planned a brigade-size assault on all army posts and Israeli communities near the Gaza border with the objective of killing as many Israelis as possible, abducting hundreds of women and children to Gaza, savagely abusing the victims, terrorizing everyone else, and gathering intelligence from the army bases.
This was the mission planned by the Hamas commanders, the mission for which they trained, armed and equipped their people, as they collected intelligence for the operation and identified the time when Israel’s alertness would be particularly low, at the end of the holidays. They kept their extensive plans from leaking and pulled off a perfectly executed deception: The Israel political and military leadership, from Benjamin Netanyahu on down, was convinced that Hamas was deterred and mainly focused on economic growth and not preparations for an invasion.
Hamas’ military build-up was not kept completely out of sight. Its terrorists trained right out in the open, in broad daylight, and the Israeli side that was monitoring this activity saw infantry units being built and training for combat in Gaza.
But the IDF assumed that the Hamas elite force was being built to fight the IDF, Nukhba versus Golani, and interpreted it as a sign of Hamas becoming more establishment and transforming from a terrorist organization into a regular army. Israel failed to grasp that the confrontation with the IDF would only be a secondary mission, while the main effort would be a mass slaughter of civilians in their homes and at a large outdoor event, all through the area, and all at the same time.
This is how Hamas acted on the operational level, when the terrorists neutralized observation stations and seized control of military posts to shut down Israel’s combat intelligence, to paralyze the IDF’s command and control and leave the civilian communities defenseless.
And this is how they acted on the tactical level, in the communities that were assaulted. A holding force was positioned at the entrance to each community to block any arriving reinforcements, while the main force went house to house, where the terrorists murdered and raped and burned and tortured and kidnapped as many victims as they could find.
No one in Israel ever identified this horrific scenario as the enemy’s military objective. The scenarios for which the IDF prepared resembled occurrences from the last Gaza war in 2014: an incursion by a small force via a tunnel, a breach in the fence, or boats from the sea against an IDF outpost, or perhaps against a village or two, in order to kill and kidnap a small number of soldiers and civilians.
It was in accordance with this scenario that the thin Gaza Division force was deployed. This was the scenario that its commanders and soldiers trained for. The IDF General Staff assumed there would be sufficient warning, that the underground barrier and the border fence would thwart or delay any major attack, and that the air force would very quickly come to aid the defensive effort. [Post edited 20 Oct 2023 11:46]
|
Here's an extract from the other article.
The icing on this lethal cake was provided by the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. Years of corrupting the civil service, advancing cronies and ignoring conflicts of interest, all the while sowing hatred and a schism in the nation, reached their peak when Netanyahu became entangled in criminal matters. From that moment, every means justified the end: to extricate him. That included the encouragement of a cold civil war between the contentious camps, an attempt to enact legislation for a regime coup, and readiness to tear apart the IDF after the chief of staff refused to punish reservists who ceased to volunteer in an attempt to halt the coup.
From a sea of warning signs during the first nine crazy months of this year, two should be singled out. The Bibi-ists’ systematic social media attacks, with the government’s encouragement, on U.S. President Joe Biden; and Netanyahu’s remark to the newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth that the country could get along without two air force squadrons, but not with pilots’ and navigators’ “refusal [to serve].” Where would we be now without the backing of the United States and without the air force – two of the foundational pillars of Israel’s security conception?
The far-right government, which fuses Likud, hardalim, or nationalist ultra-Orthodox, and Haredim, knew what the stakes were. As early as last February, all the intelligence organizations warned that Israel’s enemies were detecting internal weakness that stemmed from the huge political crisis, and were considering the possibility of exploiting it. That does not diminish the severity of the sweeping failure of the intelligence community to discern Hamas’ operative plan and the fact that it would be implemented in the immediate future. With all that Hamas achieved – and part of the plan was even more ambitious, but was blocked – it could have been stopped in advance if only the pieces of information had been analyzed correctly and if the intelligence and defensive deployment had been more serious and more thorough.
But this was compounded by the horrendous failure of the political decision-makers. Over a decade, Netanyahu consistently cultivated Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip to slough off international pressure to renew the diplomatic process with the competing Palestinian camp, that of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. He ignored a strategic warning issued by the research division of Military Intelligence six years ago, about an explosion that would occur in the Palestinian arena. The prime minister advocated a policy of rounds of fighting, and stopped every significant military operation in Gaza before it got to the ground maneuver stage. To be fair, it has to be noted that all the sides, from both the right and the left (as well as we in the media), played down the scale of the military threat posed by Hamas while fearing a casualty-fraught ground operation. | | | |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 12:39 - Oct 20 with 3005 views | leitrimblue |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 12:16 - Oct 20 by DJR |
Here's an extract from the other article.
The icing on this lethal cake was provided by the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. Years of corrupting the civil service, advancing cronies and ignoring conflicts of interest, all the while sowing hatred and a schism in the nation, reached their peak when Netanyahu became entangled in criminal matters. From that moment, every means justified the end: to extricate him. That included the encouragement of a cold civil war between the contentious camps, an attempt to enact legislation for a regime coup, and readiness to tear apart the IDF after the chief of staff refused to punish reservists who ceased to volunteer in an attempt to halt the coup.
From a sea of warning signs during the first nine crazy months of this year, two should be singled out. The Bibi-ists’ systematic social media attacks, with the government’s encouragement, on U.S. President Joe Biden; and Netanyahu’s remark to the newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth that the country could get along without two air force squadrons, but not with pilots’ and navigators’ “refusal [to serve].” Where would we be now without the backing of the United States and without the air force – two of the foundational pillars of Israel’s security conception?
The far-right government, which fuses Likud, hardalim, or nationalist ultra-Orthodox, and Haredim, knew what the stakes were. As early as last February, all the intelligence organizations warned that Israel’s enemies were detecting internal weakness that stemmed from the huge political crisis, and were considering the possibility of exploiting it. That does not diminish the severity of the sweeping failure of the intelligence community to discern Hamas’ operative plan and the fact that it would be implemented in the immediate future. With all that Hamas achieved – and part of the plan was even more ambitious, but was blocked – it could have been stopped in advance if only the pieces of information had been analyzed correctly and if the intelligence and defensive deployment had been more serious and more thorough.
But this was compounded by the horrendous failure of the political decision-makers. Over a decade, Netanyahu consistently cultivated Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip to slough off international pressure to renew the diplomatic process with the competing Palestinian camp, that of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. He ignored a strategic warning issued by the research division of Military Intelligence six years ago, about an explosion that would occur in the Palestinian arena. The prime minister advocated a policy of rounds of fighting, and stopped every significant military operation in Gaza before it got to the ground maneuver stage. To be fair, it has to be noted that all the sides, from both the right and the left (as well as we in the media), played down the scale of the military threat posed by Hamas while fearing a casualty-fraught ground operation. |
Couldn't read the articles but your extracts are very interesting. Do you get any idea from reading the full articles how much support Netanyahu has or what percentage of the Israeli population support him and his actions in Gaza? |  | | |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 12:45 - Oct 20 with 2983 views | GlasgowBlue |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 12:39 - Oct 20 by leitrimblue |
Couldn't read the articles but your extracts are very interesting. Do you get any idea from reading the full articles how much support Netanyahu has or what percentage of the Israeli population support him and his actions in Gaza? |
Well he hasn’t won an election in yonks and has to rely on fanatics in his coalition, so doesn’t have wide support in Israel
I would imagine that support for the action in Gaza has increased though. That would be entirely understandable given the atrocities committed two weeks ago. | |
| |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 16:39 - Oct 20 with 2848 views | DJR |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 12:39 - Oct 20 by leitrimblue |
Couldn't read the articles but your extracts are very interesting. Do you get any idea from reading the full articles how much support Netanyahu has or what percentage of the Israeli population support him and his actions in Gaza? |
Not from those articles, but the following are extracts from a Haaretz article four days ago.
"Analysis | Shock at Attack, Fury at Failure: How Netanyahu’s Approval Ratings Have Hit Rock Bottom in Israel
New polls show Israelis believe the Hamas attack exposed a domestic 'leadership debacle'; two-thirds prefer literally anyone but Netanyahu to be Israel’s next prime minister. But, like their government, Israelis' vision for post-war Gaza are hazy
Several surveys have been published in the 10 days since the worst terror attack in Israel’s history, sparking a ferocious war on all of Gaza. Together, their findings illustrate a society that is furious at its government, anguished over the nation’s failure, and militant about Gaza – even as there is no firm vision for what can or should happen there in the future.
.
Polling during times of disaster has fundamental caveats. Israel is experiencing unprecedented shock. Public opinion will shift as people process the manifold stages of trauma, while adjusting to a radically changed reality in the coming phase. Now more than ever, polling is a snapshot.
For the moment, Israelis are taking clear aim at the Netanyahu government. The polling company for Maariv, Lazar Research, found a dramatic shift in its post-Hamas-attack survey, conducted on October 11-12 among a representative sample of all Israelis, both Jews and Arabs, just a week after its poll with a similar sample showing some recovery for the coalition.
In this survey, Likud sank to just 19 seats, a precipitous drop of 32 percent compared to the pre-attack poll. Gantz’s National Unity Party catapulted from 29 to 41 seats, up 41 percent; on the evening of October 11 – the middle of data collection for this survey – Israelis learned that Gantz agreed to join an emergency coalition with Netanyahu.
Netanyahu’s personal ratings have hit rock bottom. Respondents were asked who they would prefer to see as prime minister after the war, “Netanyahu or someone else.” Two-thirds chose someone else, anyone else, without even knowing who it would be. That was more than three times the number who chose Netanyahu (just 21 percent).
Among those who voted for Likud, just under half preferred Netanyahu, while one-third supported someone else. Among Yesh Atid and National Unity Party voters, zero percent preferred Netanyahu over an anonymous “someone else.” In a direct head-to-head, only 29 percent preferred Netanyahu to Gantz as “suited to be prime minister,” while 48 percent chose Gantz.
While the reasons for Netanyahu’s plunge appear obvious, a second poll provides explanations grounded in data.
This survey was conducted by Camil Fuchs among Israel’s Jewish population only (I personally do not approve of Jewish-only polling, but the survey was conducted on commission for a private group, and the data is worth including here because it is so indicative).
The survey asked if the Hamas attack showed there was a “leadership debacle“ in Israel or not. A near-consensus of 84 percent of the (Jewish) respondents said there had been a debacle – including sweeping agreement from 79 percent of those who voted for the current coalition last November.
Another powerful majority, three-quarters of the Jewish respondents in Fuchs’ poll, said the government had either a very great or great responsibility for the situation leading to the collapse of defense systems for the southern communities. Just 7 percent said it had little or no such responsibility. No fewer than 61 percent of voters for Netanyahu’s own coalition said the government bears very great or great responsibility.
Nevertheless, when asked if leading figures in the government should resign, voters reflect the deep divisions that have characterized the entire year since this government was established in late December 2022.
Among Israeli Jews who voted for opposition parties, 90 percent want either Netanyahu (23 percent), Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (2 percent) or both of them (65 percent) to go. But only one-quarter of those who voted for the coalition want both Gallant and Netanyahu to resign, and just 4 percent of coalition voters believe Netanyahu should quit.
What about the impact of the Hamas attacks and the subsequent Gaza war on how Israelis think? Beyond politics, the ideological trajectory of the country is hard to predict. Based on prior waves of war, I expect a firm rightward shift among Jews – but no one truly knows.
For the meantime, a majority of Israeli Jews support the militant policies regarding Gaza – not surprisingly, since there are no other options currently on the table. That’s according to a survey conducted in two waves on October 8 and 13 by Hebrew University researchers and the Agam Institute.
In both waves, over half of Jews chose the option to “occupy the entire Gaza Strip through an IDF ground invasion,” while another group – over one-third in both polls – called for a massive air and ground campaign, but without occupying Gaza. This portion of the survey has not yet been published, but I have reviewed the research report.
Fewer than 10 percent in both survey waves opted for tactical strikes aimed only at Hamas’ terror infrastructure. Like Israel’s president, Isaac Herzog, it seems that Israelis largely reject the idea that the terror infrastructure is separate from the people and society of Gaza; or else view the two as so enmeshed that the distinction is negligible given their desperation for a punishing military response.
In the October 13 survey wave, approximately 70 percent chose the most far-reaching “condition for ending the war”: topple the Hamas government in Gaza entirely.
But Israeli Jews, like their government, have no firm opinion of what to do afterward in Gaza. Thirty and 37 percent, respectively, think Israel should reoccupy Gaza with the revival of an Israeli military government, or should dismantle all Hamas infrastructure, and simply leave to let the Palestinians of Gaza decide how to govern (translation: mayhem, under the current circumstances). One-third support dismantling Hamas and encouraging Mahmoud Abbas’ Palestinian Authority to take over – an approach probably not far from mayhem either."
In the unrelenting darkness of these times, perhaps it is notable that 43 percent of Jews in the Hebrew University poll believed that the Israel Defense Forces should make strong or moderate efforts to avoid harming innocent people in its assault on Gaza.
More encouraging still is that the Arab sample for this study (over 500 people, far larger than normal media surveys) showed unambiguous majorities opposed to Hamas’ actions: 77 percent opposed the attack. Eighty-five percent opposed holding civilian hostages, including women and children (as per the question text), and of those few who did not oppose these things, most are not sure – only tiny percentages actually supported them. Two-thirds of these Palestinian citizens believed that Arab political leaders should condemn the attacks, and in fact both United Arab List head Mansour Abbas and Hadash leader Ayman Odeh have done so.
Numerous Arab citizens of Israel have been killed in the attack and ongoing rocket fire in Israel – from a medic and ambulance driver, to Bedouin villagers in communities with no shelter from rocket fire. To date, Israel has not seen a resurgence of Jewish-Arab violence in mixed cities like in 2021.
But again, polling in crisis has its caveats; data analysis is no match for a cruel, violent and rapidly changing reality." [Post edited 20 Oct 2023 16:53]
| | | |
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| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 16:41 - Oct 20 with 2829 views | DJR |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 16:39 - Oct 20 by DJR |
Not from those articles, but the following are extracts from a Haaretz article four days ago.
"Analysis | Shock at Attack, Fury at Failure: How Netanyahu’s Approval Ratings Have Hit Rock Bottom in Israel
New polls show Israelis believe the Hamas attack exposed a domestic 'leadership debacle'; two-thirds prefer literally anyone but Netanyahu to be Israel’s next prime minister. But, like their government, Israelis' vision for post-war Gaza are hazy
Several surveys have been published in the 10 days since the worst terror attack in Israel’s history, sparking a ferocious war on all of Gaza. Together, their findings illustrate a society that is furious at its government, anguished over the nation’s failure, and militant about Gaza – even as there is no firm vision for what can or should happen there in the future.
.
Polling during times of disaster has fundamental caveats. Israel is experiencing unprecedented shock. Public opinion will shift as people process the manifold stages of trauma, while adjusting to a radically changed reality in the coming phase. Now more than ever, polling is a snapshot.
For the moment, Israelis are taking clear aim at the Netanyahu government. The polling company for Maariv, Lazar Research, found a dramatic shift in its post-Hamas-attack survey, conducted on October 11-12 among a representative sample of all Israelis, both Jews and Arabs, just a week after its poll with a similar sample showing some recovery for the coalition.
In this survey, Likud sank to just 19 seats, a precipitous drop of 32 percent compared to the pre-attack poll. Gantz’s National Unity Party catapulted from 29 to 41 seats, up 41 percent; on the evening of October 11 – the middle of data collection for this survey – Israelis learned that Gantz agreed to join an emergency coalition with Netanyahu.
Netanyahu’s personal ratings have hit rock bottom. Respondents were asked who they would prefer to see as prime minister after the war, “Netanyahu or someone else.” Two-thirds chose someone else, anyone else, without even knowing who it would be. That was more than three times the number who chose Netanyahu (just 21 percent).
Among those who voted for Likud, just under half preferred Netanyahu, while one-third supported someone else. Among Yesh Atid and National Unity Party voters, zero percent preferred Netanyahu over an anonymous “someone else.” In a direct head-to-head, only 29 percent preferred Netanyahu to Gantz as “suited to be prime minister,” while 48 percent chose Gantz.
While the reasons for Netanyahu’s plunge appear obvious, a second poll provides explanations grounded in data.
This survey was conducted by Camil Fuchs among Israel’s Jewish population only (I personally do not approve of Jewish-only polling, but the survey was conducted on commission for a private group, and the data is worth including here because it is so indicative).
The survey asked if the Hamas attack showed there was a “leadership debacle“ in Israel or not. A near-consensus of 84 percent of the (Jewish) respondents said there had been a debacle – including sweeping agreement from 79 percent of those who voted for the current coalition last November.
Another powerful majority, three-quarters of the Jewish respondents in Fuchs’ poll, said the government had either a very great or great responsibility for the situation leading to the collapse of defense systems for the southern communities. Just 7 percent said it had little or no such responsibility. No fewer than 61 percent of voters for Netanyahu’s own coalition said the government bears very great or great responsibility.
Nevertheless, when asked if leading figures in the government should resign, voters reflect the deep divisions that have characterized the entire year since this government was established in late December 2022.
Among Israeli Jews who voted for opposition parties, 90 percent want either Netanyahu (23 percent), Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (2 percent) or both of them (65 percent) to go. But only one-quarter of those who voted for the coalition want both Gallant and Netanyahu to resign, and just 4 percent of coalition voters believe Netanyahu should quit.
What about the impact of the Hamas attacks and the subsequent Gaza war on how Israelis think? Beyond politics, the ideological trajectory of the country is hard to predict. Based on prior waves of war, I expect a firm rightward shift among Jews – but no one truly knows.
For the meantime, a majority of Israeli Jews support the militant policies regarding Gaza – not surprisingly, since there are no other options currently on the table. That’s according to a survey conducted in two waves on October 8 and 13 by Hebrew University researchers and the Agam Institute.
In both waves, over half of Jews chose the option to “occupy the entire Gaza Strip through an IDF ground invasion,” while another group – over one-third in both polls – called for a massive air and ground campaign, but without occupying Gaza. This portion of the survey has not yet been published, but I have reviewed the research report.
Fewer than 10 percent in both survey waves opted for tactical strikes aimed only at Hamas’ terror infrastructure. Like Israel’s president, Isaac Herzog, it seems that Israelis largely reject the idea that the terror infrastructure is separate from the people and society of Gaza; or else view the two as so enmeshed that the distinction is negligible given their desperation for a punishing military response.
In the October 13 survey wave, approximately 70 percent chose the most far-reaching “condition for ending the war”: topple the Hamas government in Gaza entirely.
But Israeli Jews, like their government, have no firm opinion of what to do afterward in Gaza. Thirty and 37 percent, respectively, think Israel should reoccupy Gaza with the revival of an Israeli military government, or should dismantle all Hamas infrastructure, and simply leave to let the Palestinians of Gaza decide how to govern (translation: mayhem, under the current circumstances). One-third support dismantling Hamas and encouraging Mahmoud Abbas’ Palestinian Authority to take over – an approach probably not far from mayhem either."
In the unrelenting darkness of these times, perhaps it is notable that 43 percent of Jews in the Hebrew University poll believed that the Israel Defense Forces should make strong or moderate efforts to avoid harming innocent people in its assault on Gaza.
More encouraging still is that the Arab sample for this study (over 500 people, far larger than normal media surveys) showed unambiguous majorities opposed to Hamas’ actions: 77 percent opposed the attack. Eighty-five percent opposed holding civilian hostages, including women and children (as per the question text), and of those few who did not oppose these things, most are not sure – only tiny percentages actually supported them. Two-thirds of these Palestinian citizens believed that Arab political leaders should condemn the attacks, and in fact both United Arab List head Mansour Abbas and Hadash leader Ayman Odeh have done so.
Numerous Arab citizens of Israel have been killed in the attack and ongoing rocket fire in Israel – from a medic and ambulance driver, to Bedouin villagers in communities with no shelter from rocket fire. To date, Israel has not seen a resurgence of Jewish-Arab violence in mixed cities like in 2021.
But again, polling in crisis has its caveats; data analysis is no match for a cruel, violent and rapidly changing reality." [Post edited 20 Oct 2023 16:53]
|
These from the above extracts are encouraging.
In the unrelenting darkness of these times, perhaps it is notable that 43 percent of Jews in the Hebrew University poll believed that the Israel Defense Forces should make strong or moderate efforts to avoid harming innocent people in its assault on Gaza.
More encouraging still is that the Arab sample for this study (over 500 people, far larger than normal media surveys) showed unambiguous majorities opposed to Hamas’ actions: 77 percent opposed the attack. Eighty-five percent opposed holding civilian hostages, including women and children (as per the question text), and of those few who did not oppose these things, most are not sure – only tiny percentages actually supported them. Two-thirds of these Palestinian citizens believed that Arab political leaders should condemn the attacks, and in fact both United Arab List head Mansour Abbas and Hadash leader Ayman Odeh have done so. [Post edited 20 Oct 2023 16:43]
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| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 08:22 - Oct 21 with 2714 views | DJR |
Here's another extract from an article in Haaretz written about a week ago, which is pretty damning of Netanyahu.
"Effectively, Netanyahu’s entire worldview collapsed over the course of a single day. He was convinced that he could make deals with corrupt Arab tyrants while ignoring the cornerstone of the Arab-Jewish conflict, the Palestinians. His life’s work was to turn the ship of state from the course steered by his predecessors, from Yitzhak Rabin to Ehud Olmert, and make the two-state solution impossible. En route to this goal, he found a partner in Hamas.
“Anyone who wants to thwart the establishment of a Palestinian state has to support bolstering Hamas and transferring money to Hamas,” he told a meeting of his Likud party’s Knesset members in March 2019. “This is part of our strategy – to isolate the Palestinians in Gaza from the Palestinians in the West Bank.”" | | | |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 08:50 - Oct 21 with 2678 views | DJR |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 08:22 - Oct 21 by DJR |
Here's another extract from an article in Haaretz written about a week ago, which is pretty damning of Netanyahu.
"Effectively, Netanyahu’s entire worldview collapsed over the course of a single day. He was convinced that he could make deals with corrupt Arab tyrants while ignoring the cornerstone of the Arab-Jewish conflict, the Palestinians. His life’s work was to turn the ship of state from the course steered by his predecessors, from Yitzhak Rabin to Ehud Olmert, and make the two-state solution impossible. En route to this goal, he found a partner in Hamas.
“Anyone who wants to thwart the establishment of a Palestinian state has to support bolstering Hamas and transferring money to Hamas,” he told a meeting of his Likud party’s Knesset members in March 2019. “This is part of our strategy – to isolate the Palestinians in Gaza from the Palestinians in the West Bank.”" |
And when it comes to Palestinians in the West Bank this is a development I wasn't aware of.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/21/the-most-successful-land-grab-stra [Post edited 21 Oct 2023 8:52]
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| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 10:05 - Oct 21 with 2627 views | redrickstuhaart |
I bet that the hostages would swiftly be released in return for agreement to cease settlements and withdraw back to internationally recognised borders. | | | |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 10:32 - Oct 21 with 2609 views | GlasgowBlue |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 10:05 - Oct 21 by redrickstuhaart |
I bet that the hostages would swiftly be released in return for agreement to cease settlements and withdraw back to internationally recognised borders. |
No they wouldn’t. Stop believing that Hamas want Peace. They are a jihadist terror organisation. No different to IS.
Hamas don’t recognise international borders. Their charter calls for the eradication of a Israel.
Your statement is naive, dangerous and excuses the atrocities of Hamas. [Post edited 21 Oct 2023 10:35]
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| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 10:44 - Oct 21 with 2580 views | redrickstuhaart |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 10:32 - Oct 21 by GlasgowBlue |
No they wouldn’t. Stop believing that Hamas want Peace. They are a jihadist terror organisation. No different to IS.
Hamas don’t recognise international borders. Their charter calls for the eradication of a Israel.
Your statement is naive, dangerous and excuses the atrocities of Hamas. [Post edited 21 Oct 2023 10:35]
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You appear to have read something different to what I wrote.
And appear naive about how these ideologies become attractive to people.
The point is an obvious one. Without thise behaviour by Israel, Hamas would not be supported as it is. Some hardcore religous loons would probably remain hateful and dangerous, but that is not the same thing.
Your final sentence is offensive bollx. How dare you? [Post edited 21 Oct 2023 10:46]
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| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 11:01 - Oct 21 with 2550 views | GlasgowBlue |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 10:44 - Oct 21 by redrickstuhaart |
You appear to have read something different to what I wrote.
And appear naive about how these ideologies become attractive to people.
The point is an obvious one. Without thise behaviour by Israel, Hamas would not be supported as it is. Some hardcore religous loons would probably remain hateful and dangerous, but that is not the same thing.
Your final sentence is offensive bollx. How dare you? [Post edited 21 Oct 2023 10:46]
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Yeah. Well I find it pretty offensive that you believe that Hamas would release the 200 hostages they forcibly abducted, may members of families they slaughtered just 14 day as ago, for concessions that they have no interest in.
Hamas charter states that Israel should be eradicated and that all Jews throughout the world, including members of my family, are legitimate targets.
You are giving them demands to be met by the Israeli government that they have no interest in. IMO that is giving them some legitimacy and excuse to carry out their barbarity.
If that offends you then I suggest that you take some time to educate yourself about Hamas and its aims. [Post edited 21 Oct 2023 11:03]
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| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 11:06 - Oct 21 with 2533 views | redrickstuhaart |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 11:01 - Oct 21 by GlasgowBlue |
Yeah. Well I find it pretty offensive that you believe that Hamas would release the 200 hostages they forcibly abducted, may members of families they slaughtered just 14 day as ago, for concessions that they have no interest in.
Hamas charter states that Israel should be eradicated and that all Jews throughout the world, including members of my family, are legitimate targets.
You are giving them demands to be met by the Israeli government that they have no interest in. IMO that is giving them some legitimacy and excuse to carry out their barbarity.
If that offends you then I suggest that you take some time to educate yourself about Hamas and its aims. [Post edited 21 Oct 2023 11:03]
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Im well aware of the charter. Im also well aware of how Israel behave. Both are disgusting in many respects. Keep dodging the point.
Of course they are interested in concessions. Even if it is just to increase their support and credibility with the population. The reality is that if these settlement events and annexations were not happening, their influence, power and sympathy in those communities would be far smaller, and their reach reduced.
To suggest that recognising reality is "excusing" atrocities is just a terrible argument, logically, and and obnoxious one in interpersonal terms. | | | |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 08:46 - Nov 1 with 1961 views | ibbleobble |
True. Enabling was the wrong choice of word. I found this article interesting on the use of tunnels and their creation. Although known for nearly two decades, it highlights some of the issues facing Israeli intelligence to detect them let alone eradicate them. Sadly, their are some stark prophecies in this article about what was to come if they weren’t dealt with:
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/07/30/336594614/gazas-network-of-tun | | | |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 16:47 - Dec 1 with 1347 views | ibbleobble |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 11:32 - Oct 20 by DJR |
I've have recently subscribed so as to get daily emails from Haaretz, an Israeli newspaper on the left or centre-left. According to the Center for Research Libraries (a consortium of North American libraries), among Israel's daily newspapers, "Haaretz is considered the most influential and respected for both its news coverage and its commentary."
Here are a couple of articles on Israel's failings.
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-20/ty-article/.premium/underprepared
https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2023-10-20/ty-article-opinion/.premium/eyes-wide
EDIT: apologies. I think you can only read these articles in full if like me you have signed up.
Here's an extract from one of the articles.
Mohammed Deif and Yahya Sinwar planned a brigade-size assault on all army posts and Israeli communities near the Gaza border with the objective of killing as many Israelis as possible, abducting hundreds of women and children to Gaza, savagely abusing the victims, terrorizing everyone else, and gathering intelligence from the army bases.
This was the mission planned by the Hamas commanders, the mission for which they trained, armed and equipped their people, as they collected intelligence for the operation and identified the time when Israel’s alertness would be particularly low, at the end of the holidays. They kept their extensive plans from leaking and pulled off a perfectly executed deception: The Israel political and military leadership, from Benjamin Netanyahu on down, was convinced that Hamas was deterred and mainly focused on economic growth and not preparations for an invasion.
Hamas’ military build-up was not kept completely out of sight. Its terrorists trained right out in the open, in broad daylight, and the Israeli side that was monitoring this activity saw infantry units being built and training for combat in Gaza.
But the IDF assumed that the Hamas elite force was being built to fight the IDF, Nukhba versus Golani, and interpreted it as a sign of Hamas becoming more establishment and transforming from a terrorist organization into a regular army. Israel failed to grasp that the confrontation with the IDF would only be a secondary mission, while the main effort would be a mass slaughter of civilians in their homes and at a large outdoor event, all through the area, and all at the same time.
This is how Hamas acted on the operational level, when the terrorists neutralized observation stations and seized control of military posts to shut down Israel’s combat intelligence, to paralyze the IDF’s command and control and leave the civilian communities defenseless.
And this is how they acted on the tactical level, in the communities that were assaulted. A holding force was positioned at the entrance to each community to block any arriving reinforcements, while the main force went house to house, where the terrorists murdered and raped and burned and tortured and kidnapped as many victims as they could find.
No one in Israel ever identified this horrific scenario as the enemy’s military objective. The scenarios for which the IDF prepared resembled occurrences from the last Gaza war in 2014: an incursion by a small force via a tunnel, a breach in the fence, or boats from the sea against an IDF outpost, or perhaps against a village or two, in order to kill and kidnap a small number of soldiers and civilians.
It was in accordance with this scenario that the thin Gaza Division force was deployed. This was the scenario that its commanders and soldiers trained for. The IDF General Staff assumed there would be sufficient warning, that the underground barrier and the border fence would thwart or delay any major attack, and that the air force would very quickly come to aid the defensive effort. [Post edited 20 Oct 2023 11:46]
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In light of this I should maybe change the title of this thread to Israeli government failings but I don’t see a way Netanyahu can survive this if challenged:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-attack-intellig | | | |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 16:51 - Dec 1 with 1320 views | pointofblue |
| The failings of Mossad and Shin Bet on 10:32 - Oct 20 by GlasgowBlue |
Yes. It doesn’t help that Israel’s Head of Security is Itamar Ben-Gvir, a far right fanatic and terrorist supporter who has been far to occupied with attempting to suppress opposition to to those judiciary reforms.
He’s in position because of his party is helping prop up the government rather than for his qualifications to head Israel’s security. |
Sorry, gave this a down arrow in error. | |
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