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First day of the Battle of the Somme. The battle finished 18 Nov 1916.
For Britain, a definitive moment of WW1, albeit one of many. The British Army suffered 57470 casualties that first day, 19240 were fatalities. The whole battle cost the British and French 640k killed, wounded and captured. The Germans 440k. Unimaginable numbers.
Haig was not particularly in favour of the assault but there was considerable pressure to relieve Verdun that was bleeding the French army to death and in fact the Germans too.
The battle was not really Blackadder - 1000s men to move Melchett’s drinks cabinet a few yards. It was much more than that. The Somme saw the blooding of Kitchener’s New Army. An army of volunteers (Pals, Chums battalions etc) - the only one of its size like that in history. It saw the introduction of new techniques and technologies, including the tank. Learning through disaster as well as innovation.
The most significant error was failure to appreciate that artillery was not cutting the wire. The Germans were dug in much deeper than was known. The British, because they thought artillery would do the job, thought it was a case of mopping up, so men were carrying far too much gear. That is why they walked. You try running with 60lbs of kit!
As I’ve said on here before, my grandfather was present that day in a trench called St Andrews Avenue in front of La Boisselle. Under the Germans was a mine of 40000lbs of amatol called YSap. Next to it 60000lbs at Lochnagar. They’d been dug by miners, telephone engineers etc of 179 RE Tunnelling Co. They were fired at 7.28 - the Lochnagar explosion under the Schwaben Redoubt was heard in London and was at the time the largest man made explosion in history.
Unfortunately an officer phoned had somebody in the front line to wish them luck the night before. The Germans heard and evacuated YSay. Not so lucky were those under the Lochnagar mine who were vapourised, buried, blown to pieces.
34 Division were tasked with taking the village and surrounding area. The four Northumberland Fusiliers Battalions, the Grimsby Chums and the Suffolk were to attack after the mines went up. The plan was that the Tyneside Irish NF would carry the kit in the third wave to ‘turn’ trenches, to build positions with the three Norfolk RE Field Companies, hence why I know from the field company record exactly where my grandfather was.
The surviving Germans had time to rise to their defences and with artillery and raking machine gun fire, the attack was a disaster. 34 Division were all but wiped out with the highest casualties of the day. Many didn’t even make their own front line trenches before being mown down. The RE Field Companies rose at the back of the last wave and were immediately shot back into the trench or dived in to shell holes/scattered until an officer ordered around half of them to stop.
The Field companies’ casualties weren’t too bad, relatively, and the survivors were detailed to supply the soldiers that had captured the mine crater and to defend their own trenches from possible counter attack.
What was left of the NFs, Chums and Suffolks were withdrawn from the battle to re-equip, but the REs stayed to build roads, defences etc and fresh battalions drafted into the line. The battles that followed for places like High Wood saw unspeakable brutality hence the astronomic losses.
WW1 is fascinating, but it’s scale, miseries, you name it were unbelievable and make it tough to understand.
[Post edited 1 Jul 13:51]
4
109 years ago today on 14:12 - Jul 1 with 236 views
First day of the Battle of the Somme. The battle finished 18 Nov 1916.
For Britain, a definitive moment of WW1, albeit one of many. The British Army suffered 57470 casualties that first day, 19240 were fatalities. The whole battle cost the British and French 640k killed, wounded and captured. The Germans 440k. Unimaginable numbers.
Haig was not particularly in favour of the assault but there was considerable pressure to relieve Verdun that was bleeding the French army to death and in fact the Germans too.
The battle was not really Blackadder - 1000s men to move Melchett’s drinks cabinet a few yards. It was much more than that. The Somme saw the blooding of Kitchener’s New Army. An army of volunteers (Pals, Chums battalions etc) - the only one of its size like that in history. It saw the introduction of new techniques and technologies, including the tank. Learning through disaster as well as innovation.
The most significant error was failure to appreciate that artillery was not cutting the wire. The Germans were dug in much deeper than was known. The British, because they thought artillery would do the job, thought it was a case of mopping up, so men were carrying far too much gear. That is why they walked. You try running with 60lbs of kit!
As I’ve said on here before, my grandfather was present that day in a trench called St Andrews Avenue in front of La Boisselle. Under the Germans was a mine of 40000lbs of amatol called YSap. Next to it 60000lbs at Lochnagar. They’d been dug by miners, telephone engineers etc of 179 RE Tunnelling Co. They were fired at 7.28 - the Lochnagar explosion under the Schwaben Redoubt was heard in London and was at the time the largest man made explosion in history.
Unfortunately an officer phoned had somebody in the front line to wish them luck the night before. The Germans heard and evacuated YSay. Not so lucky were those under the Lochnagar mine who were vapourised, buried, blown to pieces.
34 Division were tasked with taking the village and surrounding area. The four Northumberland Fusiliers Battalions, the Grimsby Chums and the Suffolk were to attack after the mines went up. The plan was that the Tyneside Irish NF would carry the kit in the third wave to ‘turn’ trenches, to build positions with the three Norfolk RE Field Companies, hence why I know from the field company record exactly where my grandfather was.
The surviving Germans had time to rise to their defences and with artillery and raking machine gun fire, the attack was a disaster. 34 Division were all but wiped out with the highest casualties of the day. Many didn’t even make their own front line trenches before being mown down. The RE Field Companies rose at the back of the last wave and were immediately shot back into the trench or dived in to shell holes/scattered until an officer ordered around half of them to stop.
The Field companies’ casualties weren’t too bad, relatively, and the survivors were detailed to supply the soldiers that had captured the mine crater and to defend their own trenches from possible counter attack.
What was left of the NFs, Chums and Suffolks were withdrawn from the battle to re-equip, but the REs stayed to build roads, defences etc and fresh battalions drafted into the line. The battles that followed for places like High Wood saw unspeakable brutality hence the astronomic losses.
WW1 is fascinating, but it’s scale, miseries, you name it were unbelievable and make it tough to understand.
[Post edited 1 Jul 13:51]
Some of the problems were down to long-service professional senior officers underestimating what the volunteer armies were capable of in terms of maneuver. Thus the assault plan was kept basic to prevent disorganisation. And it was actually quite successful on the right (in conjunction with the French).
The British were not the only ones to overestimate the effectiveness of raw artillery volume. The Germans had done it at Verdun and the French were to repeat the error on the Aisne in 1917 (leading to mutiny and near-collapse). Again, that wasn't helped by views of inexperienced New Army gunners. It was not until 1918 that barrage systems reached their sophisitcated peak enabling the breakthroughs of the German spring offensives and the Allied counter-push which ended the war in late summer and autumn.
Some of the problems were down to long-service professional senior officers underestimating what the volunteer armies were capable of in terms of maneuver. Thus the assault plan was kept basic to prevent disorganisation. And it was actually quite successful on the right (in conjunction with the French).
The British were not the only ones to overestimate the effectiveness of raw artillery volume. The Germans had done it at Verdun and the French were to repeat the error on the Aisne in 1917 (leading to mutiny and near-collapse). Again, that wasn't helped by views of inexperienced New Army gunners. It was not until 1918 that barrage systems reached their sophisitcated peak enabling the breakthroughs of the German spring offensives and the Allied counter-push which ended the war in late summer and autumn.
Please may I ask what your thoughts are on General Haig? When I was at school my history teacher was heavily critical of him - is this fair, or is General Haig treated unfairly by many?
0
109 years ago today on 14:29 - Jul 1 with 212 views
Some of the problems were down to long-service professional senior officers underestimating what the volunteer armies were capable of in terms of maneuver. Thus the assault plan was kept basic to prevent disorganisation. And it was actually quite successful on the right (in conjunction with the French).
The British were not the only ones to overestimate the effectiveness of raw artillery volume. The Germans had done it at Verdun and the French were to repeat the error on the Aisne in 1917 (leading to mutiny and near-collapse). Again, that wasn't helped by views of inexperienced New Army gunners. It was not until 1918 that barrage systems reached their sophisitcated peak enabling the breakthroughs of the German spring offensives and the Allied counter-push which ended the war in late summer and autumn.
Attached is a good description of artillery performance at the Somme.
There was a lot of innovation at this time, but everyone was still learning. For example tunnelling was started by the Germans in WW1. The British developed it to such a gruesome level of sophistication, that 10000 Germans were instantly blown to smithereens, shattered or buried at Messines the following June.
But tunnelling was only relevant in static warfare. The Tank of course was anything but. However, invented in Britain, they were unreliable, ghastly monsters and nobody knew how to use them. The learned by 1918 though. Same with developing aircraft to close support, utilising light, fairground style, railways to quickly support and move stuff and people around, better communication devices, you name it.
2
109 years ago today on 14:53 - Jul 1 with 193 views
109 years ago today on 14:18 - Jul 1 by MattinLondon
Please may I ask what your thoughts are on General Haig? When I was at school my history teacher was heavily critical of him - is this fair, or is General Haig treated unfairly by many?
A lot of that comes down to the "lions led by donkeys" mythmaking which grew up in the disillusioned and economically battered 1920s and '30s. Which in turn found its way into the history writing* and teaching of the 1950s to '70s.
In his memoirs Bernard Montgomery (who had served on the front-line in WWI and subsequently rose to high command) says he thinks Haig's personal demeanour, that of a dour, reserved lowland Scot, a product of the late Victorian military, hindered his interactions with lower-ranking officers and men. Thus he came across as detatched, cold and uncaring. He was concerned for soldiers' welfare, but not good at expressing it Combined with the huge casualties of battles he oversaw, it left a bad impression. An area in which Monty himself consciously strove to do better.
Haig was also less politically adept than some of his rivals/opponents, the likes of Henry Wilson and Lloyd George. They being happy to have him painted poorly in the press and Parliament. Not to mention subsequent autobiography.
In reality, Haig spent quite a lot of his time resisting French pressure to conduct offensives which he thought were ill-timed, in the wrong place or likely to be too costly. He was certainly a more competent commander than Sir John French, his predecessor. But, as with almost all the senior generals, he was struggling to learn the lessons of mass industrialised warfare on a heavily fortified front. He was also at times too stubborn in continuing battles after they had stopped being worthwhile, partly through a misplaced optimism of a breakthrough to maneuver and the collapse of a worn-down enemy (which did eventually happen in 1918). He promoted competent generals, such as Plumer, Rawlinson and Allenby, tho was too fond of Gough. A somewhat mixed, but by no means bad, record. Especially when compared with some of his contemporaries (Nivelle, Falkenhayn**).
Then, after the war, he devoted himself to the Haig Fund, the best known descendant of which is the Poppy Appeal, set up to care for ex-servicemen and their dependents.
* Quite a bit of which was ideologically socialist/communist and viewing the war through a prism of class conflict.
** Edit: That's a little unfair on Falkenhayn to bracket him with Nivelle, who was a maniac.
A lot of that comes down to the "lions led by donkeys" mythmaking which grew up in the disillusioned and economically battered 1920s and '30s. Which in turn found its way into the history writing* and teaching of the 1950s to '70s.
In his memoirs Bernard Montgomery (who had served on the front-line in WWI and subsequently rose to high command) says he thinks Haig's personal demeanour, that of a dour, reserved lowland Scot, a product of the late Victorian military, hindered his interactions with lower-ranking officers and men. Thus he came across as detatched, cold and uncaring. He was concerned for soldiers' welfare, but not good at expressing it Combined with the huge casualties of battles he oversaw, it left a bad impression. An area in which Monty himself consciously strove to do better.
Haig was also less politically adept than some of his rivals/opponents, the likes of Henry Wilson and Lloyd George. They being happy to have him painted poorly in the press and Parliament. Not to mention subsequent autobiography.
In reality, Haig spent quite a lot of his time resisting French pressure to conduct offensives which he thought were ill-timed, in the wrong place or likely to be too costly. He was certainly a more competent commander than Sir John French, his predecessor. But, as with almost all the senior generals, he was struggling to learn the lessons of mass industrialised warfare on a heavily fortified front. He was also at times too stubborn in continuing battles after they had stopped being worthwhile, partly through a misplaced optimism of a breakthrough to maneuver and the collapse of a worn-down enemy (which did eventually happen in 1918). He promoted competent generals, such as Plumer, Rawlinson and Allenby, tho was too fond of Gough. A somewhat mixed, but by no means bad, record. Especially when compared with some of his contemporaries (Nivelle, Falkenhayn**).
Then, after the war, he devoted himself to the Haig Fund, the best known descendant of which is the Poppy Appeal, set up to care for ex-servicemen and their dependents.
* Quite a bit of which was ideologically socialist/communist and viewing the war through a prism of class conflict.
** Edit: That's a little unfair on Falkenhayn to bracket him with Nivelle, who was a maniac.
[Post edited 1 Jul 15:04]
Good summary.
It is notable that funding for his statue in Whitehall was raised by public subscription and a lot of the 1918 victory memorabilia features him along with the very undeserving David Beatty (should have been Jellicoe).
Haig did, in his way, care about his men in a way many others didn’t. He also despite popular myth embraced new ideas, including would you believe, dentistry for the men after he got a dose of it himself and was treated by a French dentist. It should not be forgotten that nobody knew how to win an industrial war without meat grinder methods, especially after the front line extended right across France.
He was very much a Victorian which makes how we see him from 21c difficult. He had no problem sentencing his men to death for a variety of reasons in a way contemporaries didn’t and was a stickler for proper dress.
After July 1st the survivors of 34 Division were inspected by Haig. He insisted they were parade smart - even although there was only about 15% left and after what they went through. The men weren’t wholly impressed.
But back to his main job it should not be forgotten he was head honcho in the final 100 days battle where the British and Commonwealth forces under his command effectively destroyed the German army.
So how do I see Haig? Well, he’s no Napoleon, Hannibal or Robert E Lee, but he was ok for the constraints of the time and not the worst commander to take to the field.
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